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Introduction
Since the late 1970s, researchers have discovered several seasonal patterns in stock returns that constitute a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis. Regularities in stock returns or stock market anomalies comprise, among many others, the January effect (abnormally high returns in January), the Monday seasonal (significantly lower Monday returns), and the size effect (higher average risk-adjusted returns for small stocks). In this paper, we focus on the following aspect of stock market anomalies: if stock returns exhibit exploitable regularities, then smart traders are expected to take advantage of these patterns, thereby earning abnormal profits.
Consequently, on stock markets with a sufficiently large number of smart traders, anomalies are supposed to disappear as the trading of this investor group arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns.
Recent empirical findings suggest that institutional investors play the role of smart traders on stock markets and, therefore, may have an impact on stock market anomalies. Institutional investors can be characterized as informed traders who speed up the adjustment of stock prices to new information, thereby rendering the stock market more efficient. Institutions can obtain an informational advantage by exploiting economies of scale in information acquisition and processing. The marginal costs of gathering and processing information are lower for institutional than for individual traders. In addition, institutional investors may be better trained and have superior resources than individual investors. Moreover, for many years it has been common practice of companies to inform securities analysts in advance about company-specific news, and only recently regulatory measures have been launched (namely the SEC's Regulation FD) to prevent this habit. Hence, institutional investors' trading decisions may be stronger informationdriven than those of individual investors. Dennis and Weston (2001) support this view by providing evidence for U.S. stock exchanges that institutions are better informed than individual investors. Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) show that institutional investors push stock prices towards their fundamental values by exploiting individual traders' sentiment. Following Barber and Odean (2005) , individual investors display attention-based buying behavior, whereas institutions do not exhibit this kind of non-fundamental trading pattern. The impact of institutional trading on stock market anomalies has recently been covered by two papers. Kamara (1997) and Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) highlight the role of institutional investors on the Monday seasonal. They present evidence for U.S. stock markets that an increase in institutional ownership decreases the magnitude of the Monday effect. Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that an increase in institutional trading is partly responsible for the disappearance of Banz' (1981) small stock premium.
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In this study, we focus on the impact of institutional trading on a third major anomaly, namely the January effect.
2 Two of the most prominent explanations for the January effect refer to the specific trading behaviors of individual and institutional investors. First, the tax-lossselling hypothesis explains the January anomaly with tax-motivated trading of individual investors. As the end of the year approaches, individual investors sell stocks that declined in value in order to realize tax losses. After the turn of the year they re-invest in these securities, which pushes stock prices up (Ritter (1988) ). Second, the window-dressing hypothesis suggests that institutional investors' portfolio rebalancing activities are responsible for the January anomaly. Institutions are evaluated relative to their peers and, therefore, buy winners and sell losers in order to present respectable year-end portfolio holdings (Lakonishok et al. (1991) ). The findings in Sias and Starks (1997) are favorable for the tax-loss-selling hypothesis and show that individual traders are primarily responsible for the January anomaly.
This study highlights the impact of institutional traders on the January effect in Poland and Hungary. The history of both emerging stock markets provides a unique institutional environment to investigate the influence of individual and institutional investors on the January anomaly. In Poland, the pension system reform on May 19, 1999 , separates the history of the stock market into a period of predominantly individual trading and a period dominated by institutional trading. Similarly, in Hungary, private pension funds were founded in 1997 and started their financial activities in 1998. Before 1998, primarily small individual investors populated the Hungarian stock market.
The pension system reform in both countries changed the investor structure drastically due to the enrichment of the old pay-as-you-go system with a privately managed pension funds pillar.
Since 1999, these pension funds are the most important group of institutional investors on the Polish and Hungarian stock markets. In addition to the change of the investor structure, in both countries capital gains taxes do not exist, which rules out the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a rationale for the January effect. Consequently, if a January effect can be detected in the data during the period before the entrance of pension fund investors in both stock markets, then it must be driven by an anomalous trading behavior of Polish and Hungarian individual investors.
We exploit the shift in the institutional environment in both emerging capital markets to provide evidence on the impact of individual and institutional investors' trading decisions on the January anomaly.
Relying on the institutional background of the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets, we contribute to the literature answering the following two questions. First, is there evidence in favor of a January effect during the period of individual trading? If this is the case, we can conclude that individual investors' non-fundamentally driven trading decisions led to the January anomaly.
Second, in which way did Polish and Hungarian pension fund investors contribute to the January anomaly after 1999 and 1998, respectively? In case pension funds exhibit window-dressing behavior, we expect a strengthening effect on the January anomaly. In contrast, if pension funds' trading decisions are more influenced by fundamental information, a dampening effect on unusually high stock returns in January can be expected.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional background for Poland and Hungary. Section 3 characterizes the data set, while the econometric methodology is described in section 4. Section 5 contains the empirical findings, and section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Institutional Background

Poland
Re-established in 1991, the Polish stock market has grown rapidly during the last decade in terms of both the number of companies listed and market capitalization. In comparison to the two other European Union accession countries in the region, namely the Czech Republic and Hungary, the capitalization of the Polish stock market is significantly higher. It is comparable to 3 It is obvious that the date of entrance of pension funds into the stock market plays an important role in the following investigation. Similarly, one branch of the literature studies the impact of the introduction of futures markets on stock return anomalies of the spot market underlying (Kamara (1997) , Szakmary and Kiefer (2004) ). In our investigation, we can exclude an influence from the introduction of futures markets because these markets were established earlier (January 16, 1998, in Poland and March 31, 1995, in Hungary) than the appearing of pension fund investors on the stock markets took place. was raised from 15% to 19%. However, the number of firms paying dividends is low.
Hungary
The Budapest Stock Exchange, re-established in 1990, experienced a significant increase in its capitalization, attaining about 6 billion U.S. $ in 1996, mainly due to the privatization of Hungary's bigger state-owned companies such as Mol, OTP, Gedeon Richter, and Matav. In the following years, the stock market went through a phase of continuous growth, reaching a capitalization of 30 billion U.S. $ at the end of 2004.
The introduction of a three-pillar pension system on January 1, 1998, had an important influence on the Hungarian stock market because a growing share of households' savings was 7 channeled to stock market investments through pension funds. 
Data
The data for Poland contain daily closing prices for all stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in the period from October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004. 6 These time series were directly provided by the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Altogether, the sample comprises 278 firms over the indicated sample period. The time series are stock-split adjusted and corrected for outliers to assure that our results are not driven or distorted by few extreme values. For this purpose, the 0.5% of highest and lowest returns observed in the data set are excluded from the investigation and, therefore, deleted from all sub-samples.
To investigate the impact of the pension funds' investment activities, we construct two sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks as follows. We calculate a measure of each stock's institutional coverage by dividing the aggregate pension fund holdings of that stock by the overall aggregate pension fund holdings in a particular year. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage share of a particular stock in the aggregate pension fund holdings. A stock is defined as actively institutionally traded in a given year if the measure of relative institutional holdings exceeds 1%. years. This amounts to 60% of the post-event period. In an alternative, less strict definition a stock has to exceed the 1% cut-off point in at least two of the five years, i.e., during 40% of the post-event period. These criteria result in the identification of 20 stocks for the stricter definition Exchange was extended from four days to five days a week. Starting our inquiry at the beginning of October 1994 ensures that the empirical findings are neither distorted by the bubble and crash periods nor affected by the change in trading frequency. 7 We drop stocks with only marginal institutional coverage as for these stocks institutional trading behavior may not have a large impact on stock returns. The 1% cut-off point is arbitrarily chosen but proved to be an acceptable compromise for the purpose of our study. On the one hand, it allows us to eliminate those stocks which are not at all or only marginally covered by institutional investors and to and 28 stocks for the less strict definition of institutionally traded shares. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 provide additional information about these stocks. Whereas Polish pension fund investors do not have a preference for stocks of a specific sector, they concentrate their investments on large firms' stocks.
[Insert Table 1 
Methodology
In the empirical investigation we distinguish between the impact of predominantly individual versus institutional investor groups on stock returns in January. First, the hypothesis is investigated that individual investors exhibit anomalous trading behavior and cause abnormally high stock returns in January. Second, we analyze the hypothesis that institutions are informed traders relying on fundamental information and, consequently, the entrance of pension funds on the stock market dampens the anomalous January effect. If the contrary holds, the trading behavior of pension funds can be ascribed a positive contribution to higher stock returns in January relative to other months of the year, which would be in line with the window-dressing hypothesis.
The hypotheses are investigated within a panel framework and separately tested for different sub-samples of stocks from Poland and Hungary. The advantages of a panel data model over a purely time-series investigation of index data or individual shares are manifold (see, e.g., Baltagi (2001) In addition to testing the hypotheses separately for the different sub-samples described in the text, we estimate the following joint model with several dummy and interaction variables:
where all previously introduced variables are defined as in equation (1). 9 In addition, the indicator variable equals 1 for those companies included in the sample of institutionally traded stocks and is 0 otherwise. is a dummy variable with value 1 for the period of increased institutional trading and 0 otherwise. The interaction variables and correspond to and , respectively, in regression equation (1) when the latter is run for the institutional sub-samples.
The model specified above is estimated for both sub-samples of institutionally traded stocks. We henceforth refer to the version estimated with the more strictly defined institutional dummy as equation (2a) and to the less strictly defined one as equation (2b) 
where all variables are defined as in equation (1). Starting in October 1994 for Poland and in January 1994 for Hungary, we estimate this regression for a three-year time period and obtain a parameter estimate of β . This parameter is an estimate of the average January effect during the estimation period. Then we move the estimation window by one month toward the end of the sample and estimate regression (3) again. We end up with a time series of β estimates which can be plotted and subjected to a visual investigation afterwards.
Empirical Results
First, summary statistics and regression results are presented separately for the two subsamples of stocks actively traded by institutional investors, a control sample of all stocks excluding the stocks identified as institutionally traded as well as the whole sample reflecting the entire Polish and Hungarian stock markets. Hence, we are able to analyze the impact of the Polish and Hungarian pension system reform on stock returns not only through time -before and after the pension funds' appearance as institutional traders on the stock market -but also in a cross-sectional dimension, i.e., among stocks more actively traded and those nearly non-traded by institutional investors.
To gain some first insight into the seasonal patterns inherent in our data, daily average stock returns for January and for February to December are reported in Table 2 . Daily mean stock returns in January are positive and higher than average stock returns between February and December for all samples. Furthermore, for both institutional sub-samples (Panels A1, B1, A2, B2) we observe higher average January stock returns during the 1994-1999 (1994-1998) [Insert Table 2 here] Table 3 displays the empirical findings for Poland. When looking at the results for the two sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks (Panels A and B), we find evidence in favor of a pronounced January effect in the period when the Polish stock market was dominated by individual investors. The estimated coefficients of the January effect are about 0.36. All coefficient estimates of the dummy variable are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The empirical findings in favor of a January effect are insofar interesting as during the period of predominately individual trading capital gains taxes did not exist in Poland. Hence, the tax-lossselling hypothesis can be ruled out as a rationale for higher stock returns in January. We can therefore conclude that Polish stock returns dynamics exhibit an anomalous January effect during 
Inst t JAN
The results are robust towards the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable . For both institutional samples, the coefficient of is positive and significant, which can be explained by the implications of strategic trading models (Kyle (1985) , Barclay and Warner (1993) ). Rational informed investors spread their trades over time to conceal information. By breaking up a large order into several smaller trades, institutional investors reduce the overall price impact. Moreover, price impacts may be inversely related to market liquidity (Madhavan and Smidt (1993) 
JAN
The empirical findings on the joint model (2) are reported at the bottom of Table 3 for the more strictly defined dummy (equation (2a)) and for the less strictly defined version (equation (2b)). The empirical results confirm the findings on a pronounced January effect for
Given the marginal level of significance of the coefficients, we run separate regressions investigating whether a January effect exists in the post-event period. The values of the coefficients of the January dummy variables are slightly higher relative to the ones reported in Table 3 and are significant at the 1% level. Hence, a January effect exists in the period after May 19, 1999, in non-institutionally traded Polish stocks.
t JAN
12 The January effect in the pre-event period is substantially higher for institutionally traded stocks compared to the stocks in the control sample. A reason for this finding may be the extreme illiquidity of a subset of stocks in the control sample. As our study focuses on the evolution of January stock returns over time instead of the level of the January effect for particular stocks, we do not further explore this issue. actively institutionally traded Polish stocks and the substantial decrease in the anomaly's magnitude after the entrance of pension funds into the stock market. In addition, actively institutionally traded stocks earn significantly higher returns relative to the rest of the stocks. The period of increased institutional trading is accompanied by higher average stock returns compared to the period before the pension system reform.
The findings for Hungary in Table 4 Table 4 here]
The empirical results of the control sample (Panel C) also indicate that a January effect exists in the period before Hungarian pension funds invested on the stock market. The estimated parameters of are positive and significant at the 1% level. In line with the findings for t JAN Poland, the magnitude of the January effect is smaller for non-institutionally traded shares relative to stocks actively institutionally traded. More importantly, the estimated coefficients of the dummy variable are not statistically significant. This finding supports the hypothesis that the estimated decrease in the two institutional samples is caused by institutions' trading behavior and not by other factors. The decrease in the magnitude of the January effect is also observed for the whole market. In addition, the findings for the joint model support the empirical results discussed above.
Inst t JAN
All results presented are calculated for a sample where 0.5% of extreme stock returns in both tails of the distribution were dropped. As a check of robustness, we repeated the above analysis using the sample without excluding the outliers. The results for Poland are qualitatively identical. The same holds for Hungary except for the findings of the control sample. For this subsample, very few large return outliers seem to impact the findings and justify our outlier correction. Moreover, we re-run all regressions including lagged returns of the S&P 500 index.
The findings are qualitatively the same and do not change our main conclusions.
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Last, we present the findings of the rolling estimation of equation (3). For Poland, the estimated β coefficients are displayed in Figure 1 . The upper graph is the estimate for the institutionally traded sample including 20 stocks, the lower graph for the institutional sample with 28 stocks. All data points left of the first vertical marker contain January data from only the pre-event period, all points right of the second vertical marker only include January stock returns from the post-event period. The coefficients in between the two vertical lines were obtained from samples covering January stock returns from both the post-and the pre-event periods. 13 The results of both robustness checks are not reported but available on request.
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[Insert Figure 1 here]
In consistence with our theoretical proposition, we observe a drastic decline of the β parameter over time. For the pre-event period, β estimates are large. The inclusion of post-event data leads to a decrease in the estimated β coefficients. Once there are only data from post-event January stock returns included in the sample (the data to the right of the second vertical marker), β estimates sharply decline and stabilize on a considerably lower level. Thus, we observe a decreasing January effect exactly at the time when Polish pension fund managers entered the market.
14 Figure 2 shows the estimated β coefficients for the two Hungarian institutional subsamples. The β s are calculated in the same manner as for Poland. During the period before the first marker, the estimated β coefficients are about 0.50. They decline drastically to values around 0.10 after the first January stock returns from the post-event periods are included in the regressions. After the second vertical marker, the estimated β parameters increase slightly and then fall to zero. Given the fact that, contrary to the Polish market, we do not have a certain wellknown starting point for institutional trading on the Hungarian stock market, the evidence is naturally not as clear-cut as the evidence for the Polish market. The tendency of falling β coefficients, however, is nevertheless strong.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Summary and Conclusions
The increase in the number of institutional investors trading on stock markets world-wide since the end of the 1980s has been associated with a rising interest from part of financial economists in institutions' impact on stock prices. One branch of literature investigates the effect of an increase in institutional ownership on the magnitude of stock market anomalies. This paper adds to the evidence available on the Monday effect (Kamara (1997) , Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) ) and the size effect (Gompers and Metrick (2001) ) by providing empirical results on the impact of institutional trading on the January effect.
Our results shed light on the causes for the anomaly and enhance the understanding of the relationship between asset prices and the investor structure of stock markets. The major difference between previous studies and ours is the unique institutional framework we exploit to investigate the role of institutional investors for the January anomaly. After the pension system reforms in Poland on May 19, 1999, and in Hungary in 1998, pension fund investors became a large fraction of traders on the stock market. In contrast, before these dates the majority of traders were small, private investors. Moreover, capital gains taxes did not exist in Poland and Hungary during the period of predominantly individual trading.
The institutional features of the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets enable us to investigate the role of individual and institutional investors on the magnitude of the January effect. Our empirical findings are twofold. First, we can empirically confirm that there is a significant January effect in Polish and Hungarian stock returns driven by the trading behavior of individuals. Due to the lack of capital gains taxes we cannot rely on the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a rational explanation for the January effect. Instead, our findings suggest that higher stock returns in January during the period before the pension system reforms in both countries are the result of possibly sentiment-driven investment decisions by individual investors.
Second and more importantly, our empirical results show that the increase in institutional trading on the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets had a significant dampening effect on the magnitude of the January anomaly. Our evidence is comparable to the results found in Kamara (1997) and Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) for the Monday effect as well as Gompers and Metrick (2001) for the size effect in the U.S. The window-dressing hypothesis is not supported.
The empirical evidence indicates that trading by Polish and Hungarian pension funds to a certain extent arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns and, therefore, increases the efficiency of both stock markets. The price effect of irrational trading patterns seems to be partly eliminated by rational investors. which takes on the value 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (during the period of increased institutional trading at the Warsaw Stock Exchange). is a dummy variable indicating a stock's affiliation to the stricter (less strict) sub-sample of institutionally traded shares for equation 2a (2b) .
is a dummy with value 1 for the period of increased institutional trading. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, and ♣ at the 19% level. which takes on the value 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (during the period of increased institutional trading at the Budapest Stock Exchange). is a dummy variable indicating a stock's affiliation to the stricter (less strict) sub-sample of institutionally traded shares for equation 2a (2b) .
is a dummy with value 1 during the period of increased institutional trading. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
